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I. INTRODUCTION: “SEXTING:” WHAT IT IS AND THE PROBLEMS IT
CREATES
The term “sexting” is a socially created slang word that is a
combination of the words “sex” and “texting.”1 While “sexting” has not
been legally defined, there are several commonly accepted definitions.
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in its 2009
Policy Statement on Sexting, defined sexting as the action of a “youth
writing sexually explicit messages, taking sexually explicit photos of
themselves or others in their peer group, and transmitting those photos
and/or messages to their peers.”2 The Crisis Intervention Center defines
sexting as “sending, receiving, or forwarding sexually suggestive nude or
nearly nude photos or sexually suggestive messages through text
message or email.”3
Sexting has become a rising problem in the United States because
of the prevalence of technology that individuals use to communicate with
one another.4 Also, people are more likely to speak their minds and let
go of their inhibitions when they hide behind the screen of a phone or
computer, due to the anonymity technology provides along with its
simplicity of communication.5 But what many teens do not realize is that
a private message, once sent, is no longer private and any message or
photo sent between teens has the potential to be broadcast to the world
on the Internet. 6 These actions result in serious consequences to the
teenagers involved; such consequences are not only emotional, but legal

1 Theresa Edmund, Ringwood Community Addresses Sexting, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(Feb. 21, 2010, 10:36 AM EST), http://www.northjersey.com/news/education/84932002_
Parents__students_get__the_4-1-1_on_sexting_.html.
2 NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Policy Statement on Sexting,
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?
LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4130.
3 CRISIS
INTERVENTION
CENTER,
What
is
Sexting,
2010,
http://www.crisisinterventioncenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=147:what-is-sexting&catid=39:teens&Itemid=79 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
4 Edmund, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Jillian Jorgensen, There’s No Privacy with ‘Sexting,’ Officials Warn, County
Attorneys See Increase in Cases of Dangerously Intimate Messaging Practice, EAGLETRIBUNE (North Andover, Mass), Mar. 21, 2010,
http://www.eagletribune.com/newhampshire/x434657239/Theres-no-privacy-withsexting-officials-warn.
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as well.7 As the issue of sexting continues to develop, the Third Circuit’s
decision in Miller v. Mitchell 8 will likely provide the groundwork for
new legislation and potential circuit splits. This Comment argues that
education is an important starting point in solving the problem of teenage
sexting. In Miller, students suspected of sexting were given the option of
either attending a sexting educational program or being criminally
charged with felony possession or distribution of child pornography. 9
When three teenagers refused to participate in the educational program,
their parents sued the District Attorney (“D.A.”) in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania in an effort to enjoin the D.A. from bringing criminal
charges. 10 The District Court granted the parents a preliminary
injunction and the Third Circuit affirmed.11
This Comment analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision in Miller and
argues that requiring students to attend an educational program about
sexting does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from the
harmful effects of sexting.12 Additionally, requiring students to attend
sexting educational classes does not violate children’s constitutional
rights because children do not receive the same constitutional protection
of their rights that adults receive.13 Children’s rights are limited when
they are in school and when their safety or well being is in danger.14
This Comment examines the question: Who bears the responsibility of
teaching children about the risks associated with sexting: parents or the
government? The problems caused by sexting must be solved through
government intervention. Specifically, the sexting education program
described in Miller is a practical option that the government can use to
educate teenagers about the dangers of sexting.
In Part II, this Comment provides background information
surrounding the rise of sexting as a widespread phenomenon, including
the growing problems associated with sexting. Additionally, Part II
analyzes Miller v. Mitchell, and focuses on whether forcing students to
participate in a sexting educational program violates parents’
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their
7 See infra Part II for a discussion on the legal and emotional consequences of
sexting, such as pornography charges, bullying, and suicidal tendencies.
8 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
9 Id. at 142.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 143.
12 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
13 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
14 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339–40.

192

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:189

children free from government interference. 15 Part III discusses the
history of this fundamental right. Also, it examines the subsequent
judicial limitations of this right under the Fourteenth Amendment and
explains that the government can constitutionally limit a parent’s rights
when a child’s health or well being is in danger. Part III further
illuminates the way in which this limitation should apply to sexting
educational programs.
Part IV provides additional information about other instances in
which the government can limit parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to
raise their children.
Government limitations on the Fourteenth
Amendment right to parent without state interference are permissible
when the limitation relates to education;16 in particular, the government
may impose such limitations through state truancy laws and mandatory
educational subjects such as sex education classes.17 Sexting education
classes fall under this educational limit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Part V, this Comment argues that requiring students to attend
sexting education classes does not violate children’s constitutional rights.
The scope of this Comment is restricted to a discussion of the limitations
of children’s constitutional rights while they attend public school. The
government should be permitted to require students to attend sexting
education classes because the constitutional rights of children are not as
expansive as the rights of adults. 18 Although the government cannot
threaten criminal prosecution if an adult exercises a constitutionally
protected right, children’s constitutional rights are restricted, especially
while in school.19 The limited breadth of children’s constitutional rights
is due to the state’s role as custodian or in loco parentis to the children in
its jurisdiction.20
Finally, Part V discusses possible remedies to help deal with the
problem of teenage sexting. Education is an important starting point in
solving the teenage sexting problem. This Comment argues that,
although parents have a fundamental Fourteenth Amendment right to
raise their children without government intervention, 21 the sexting
15 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1978) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231–33 (U.S. 1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)).
16 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336, 339–40.
17 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514,
525 (1982).
18 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
19 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1985).
20 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
21 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1978) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231–33 (U.S. 1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)).
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problem presents a compelling state interest that calls for government
intervention. Such a resolution would continue the Supreme Court’s
established policy22 of limiting parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights in
order to uphold the state’s power of in loco parentis 23 as well as the
public school system’s power under the special needs doctrine.24 Sexting
is a problem from which the government needs to protect children,
especially because sexting affects children’s school activities and
education.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Sexting as a Widespread Problem
Not only is sexting becoming a phenomenon, but it is clear that
teenagers do not perceive the negative effects associated with texting and
are ill-equipped to deal with these consequences; because teenagers
could face criminal charges in addition to reputational damage, the stakes
of sexting are high. First, it is clear that sexting among school-age
children is on the rise. The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and
Unplanned Pregnancy and CosmoGirl.com conducted the first survey
about sexting among teenagers in 2008.25 The study found that twenty
percent of teenagers and thirty-three percent of young adults have sent
sexually suggestive pictures or videos of themselves to peers or have
posted them on the Internet. 26 The study also found that thirty-nine
percent of all teens and fifty-nine percent of all young adults have sent or
posted sexually suggestive messages other than images.27

22 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); See also discussion infra Part
III(A)(2).
23 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
24 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 655 (1995).
25 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY &
COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG
ADULTS, THENATIONALCAMPAIGN.ORG, at 1 (2008),
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf. The survey
was conducted online with a total of 1,280 individuals; Six hundred and fifty-three of
them were teenagers from ages thirteen to nineteen and 627 were young adults, ages
twenty to twenty-six. Id.
26 Id. In the National Campaign study, “young adults” encompassed those between
the ages of twenty and twenty-six. The study defines sexually suggestive picture or video
as “semi-nude or nude personal pictures or video taken of oneself and not found on the
Internet, or received from a stranger (like spam), etc.” Id.
27 Id. The study defines sexually suggestive messages as “sexually suggestive written
personal texts, emails, IMs, etc.—and not those you might receive from a stranger (like
spam), etc.” Id.
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The study discovered that most teens and young adults send these
pictures and messages to their boyfriends or girlfriends. 28 There are,
however, many teens and young adults who send the pictures and
messages to someone they have met only online or to someone they hope
to date. 29 Twenty-one percent of teen girls and thirty-nine percent of
teen boys who have “texted” sexually explicit material to someone else
have also sent it to someone they were not currently dating, but only
hoped to date. 30 The percentages were similar for young adults. 31
Fifteen percent of all teens who have sent nude or seminude pictures,
sent them to someone they had never met and only knew online.32 For
young adults, this number was similar; fifteen percent of women and
twenty-three percent of men stated that they had sexted nude or
seminude photographs of themselves to someone they had never met and
only knew online.33
Second, it is clear that teenagers who engage in sexting are unaware
of the potential consequences of their conduct. Most polled teenagers
and young adults stated that they knew that sending or posting sexually
suggestive material is potentially dangerous, but they continued to do it
anyway.34 But less than half recognized that the material they send via
text is often shared with other people.35 The study found several reasons
why teens and young adults send the sexually suggestive material. Most
of the respondents said they send and post the pictures and messages
because it is “fun and flirtatious.”36 About half of teen girls say that
“pressure from a guy” is a reason they send the messages or pictures;
only eighteen percent of boys cited pressures from girls as a reason for
sexting.37
In 2009, Cox Communications conducted a different study on teen
sexting. 38 The study found that one in five teenagers have sexted by
28

Id. at 2.
NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY &
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2 (reporting that twenty-one percent of young adult women and thirty percent
of young men have sent sexually explicit material to someone else they met online or
merely hoped to date).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 3.
35 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY &
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25, at 3.
36 Id. at 4. This number was sixty-six percent of teen girls and sixty percent of teen
boys and seventy-two percent of women and seventy percent of men. Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 COX COMMC’NS, TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY: CYBERBULLYING,
SEXTING,
AND
PARENTAL
CONTROLS
(May
2009),
29
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sending, receiving, or forwarding sexually explicit material.39 About ten
percent of these teenagers have sent sexually suggestive material to
people they do not personally know or have only met online.40 Almost
all of the teenagers who have sent “sexts” believed that nothing bad has
happened to them as a result of sexting, yet thirty percent of those
teenagers reported that these photographs were forwarded to someone
else.41 Very few teenagers who have admitted to sexting have ever been
caught sending or receiving a message.42 Finally, almost all teenagers
who participated in the study knew that it could be dangerous to send
photographs of themselves. 43 The study also found that, by contrast,
only slightly over half of the teenagers surveyed knew that there are legal
consequences, such as criminal prosecution, for engaging in sexting.44
Clearly, teenagers recognize that there are dangers associated with
sexting, but they do not appreciate the gravity of the potential harm
because they do not know all of the potential ramifications, such as legal
consequences. Many teenagers continue to sext despite acknowledging
that there are possible repercussions for their conduct.
Advances in technology exacerbate the dangers—legal and
extralegal—posed to teenagers by sexting. In particular, most teenagers
do not know the legal consequences of their actions.45 In many states,
teenagers who send, receive, and forward sexually explicit messages face
consequences such as violating child pornography laws.46 This is true
even if the pictures and videos depict the sender.47 There are also many
nonlegal, often long term, consequences that teenagers do not
understand. 48 Teenagers do not realize that once they send the
photographs, the recipient has full control over the image. 49 The
recipient of the photograph could choose to keep the image to himself or
http://www.cox.com/takecharge/safe_teens_2009/research.html (last visited DATE) (web
address no longer available). Cox Communications conducted this study among teens
from ages thirteen to eighteen. Id. The study defines “sexting” as the practice of
“sending sexually suggestive text messages or emails with nude or nearly-nude photos.”
Id. at 3.
39 Id. at 11.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 38.
42 Id. at 39.
43 Id. at 43.
44 COX COMMC’NS, supra note 38, at 43.
45 Id.
46 Elizabeth C. Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’
Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 (2010).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY &
COSMOGIRL.COM, supra note 25, at 3.
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herself, but could also choose to further disseminate it. Photographs on
the Internet can be easily shared with others and can remain on the
Internet forever.50 This could negatively affect the individual’s future
education and career prospects if the photographs appear in a college or
employer’s investigation.51
Bullying is another problem that has been connected with sexting.
In 2008, eighteen-year-old Jesse Logan committed suicide after being
bullied about the nude photographs she had sent to her boyfriend.52 After
Jesse and her boyfriend broke up, he distributed the photographs to other
girls in their high school.53 The girls bullied Jesse by labeling her with
slurs such as “whore” and “slut,” and by throwing objects at her, causing
Jesse to become depressed and ultimately commit suicide.54 This case is
not unique.55
Recently, in Washington State, eighth-grader Margarite used her
phone to send a nude picture to her boyfriend, Isaiah. 56 After their
relationship ended, he forwarded the saved picture to Margarite’s friend,
who then forwarded the picture to everyone in her phone’s contact list.57
Consequently, the entire school obtained a copy of the photograph;
Margarite’s friends shunned and bullied her.58 Authorities charged three
students, including Isaiah and Margarite’s former friend, with felonies of
disseminating child pornography.59 The students faced prison time in a
juvenile detention center and were required to register as sex offenders.60
Margarite must permanently live with the consequences of her actions.
B. Miller v. Mitchell: A New Problem for the Federal Courts
Sexting has also caught the attention of the United States judicial
system. Perhaps due to the increasing public attention given to the issue,
the courts have taken up sexting as an important subject of criminal and
50 Id. Content can remain on the Internet even after it has been deleted by the person
who posted it. Content can also be copied from the Internet before it is erased and saved
on that person’s computer. See id.
51 Eraker, supra note 46, at 557.
52 Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over ‘Sexting,’ MSNBC TODAY:
PARENTING (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:26 AM EST), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/29546030.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See, Michael Inbar, ‘Sexting’ Bullying Cited in Teen’s Suicide, MSNBC TODAY:
PEOPLE (Dec. 2, 2009, 10:26:16 AM EST), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/34236377.
56 Jann Hoffman, A Girl’s Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2011, at A1.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2.
60 Id. at 3.
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civil disputes. Sexting cases are relevant to the federal courts due to
claims involving the constitutional rights of teenagers and their parents.
Miller v. Mitchell 61 is the first circuit court case to address the
constitutionality of prosecuting teenagers for sexting.
The plaintiffs in Miller defined “sexting” as “the practice of
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images,
including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over
the Internet.”62 In Miller, school district officials in Pennsylvania found
students’ cell phones containing nude photos of several teenage female
students in their district.63 The district officials discovered that students
had been exchanging the images on their phones and gave the phones to
the Wyoming County District Attorney’s Office. 64 The District
Attorney, George Skumanick, launched an investigation and announced
to reporters that students possessing these images could be prosecuted for
violating either of two Pennsylvania statutes.65
District Attorney Skumanick’s claims against the students were
twofold. First, he claimed that the students could be prosecuted for
possessing or distributing child pornography under a statute involving
the sexual abuse of children. 66 The statute makes it a crime for any
person to depict a child under eighteen years old engaging in a sexual act
or an imitation of the act and makes it a crime to knowingly distribute or
transfer any material that shows a child engaging in a sexual act or
simulation.67 It is also an offense to “intentionally view” or “knowingly
possess” this material.68 Second, the District Attorney claimed that the
students could be prosecuted under the statute prohibiting the “criminal
use of a communication facility,” 69 which states that it is a criminal
offense to use a communication facility, such as a phone, to commit or
facilitate a felony.70
District Attorney Skumanick then sent a letter to the parents of
sixteen to twenty students whose cell phones allegedly contained the
sexually explicit images and to the students depicted in the photos.71 The
letter stated that charges would be brought against the students unless
61

598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 143.
63 Id. School officials learned that male students were trading these images over their
phones and then confiscated the suspected students’ phones. Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (2011).
67 Id. at § 6312(b)–(c).
68 Id. at § 6312(d).
69 Miller, 598 F.3d at 143 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7512 (2011)).
70 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7512 (2011).
71 Miller, 598 F.3d at 143.
62
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they participated in an educational program. 72 Participation in the
program was voluntary; however, if the student completed it, then no
charges would be filed and there would be no record of the student’s
involvement in criminal activity.73 The District Attorney’s office, the
Juvenile Probation Department, and the Victims Resource Center
designed the program, the goal of which was to counsel and educate
students about the dangers of sexting.74 The proposed program would
last six to nine months,75 and if a student did not complete the program,
the District Attorney would file charges against that student for
possessing or distributing child pornography.76
The proposed educational program separated male from female
students and required each student to write an essay explaining what he
or she did and why it was wrong.77 The topics comprising the program
included sexual violence, sexual harassment, and sessions titled “Gender
identity-Gender strengths” and “Self Concept.”78 An example of one of
the female group objectives was to “gain an understanding of what it
means to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and
disadvantages.”79 All of the parents agreed to the program except for the
parents of the three students who filed the suit.80
The parents of these three students responded by obtaining
assistance from the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, and
filing for a temporary restraining order enjoining the District Attorney
from charging the teenagers. At the trial level, the plaintiffs in Miller
brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of
action when a state official has deprived an individual of his or her
constitutional rights. 81 To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must
72

Id.
Id.
74 Id. at 143–44.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 144.
77 Miller, 598 F.3d at 144. In the first session of the program, the students were
required to write “a report explaining why you are here, [w]hat you did, [w]hy it was
wrong, [d]id you create a victim? If so, who? [A]nd how their actions affect[ed] the
victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the community.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 145.
81 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
73
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prove that their actions were constitutionally protected and the
government retaliated in response to those actions. 82 The plaintiffs
claimed that Pennsylvania’s District Attorney threatened prosecution as
retaliation for the exercise of three different constitutionally protected
rights.83
First, the plaintiffs maintained that the District Attorney’s threat of
prosecution and imposition of a sexting education requirement was made
in retaliation for the students’ exercise of their First Amendment right of
free speech and expression.84 They asserted that the students’ actions of
appearing in the photographs were constitutionally protected expressions
under the First Amendment. 85 Second, plaintiffs maintained that the
District Attorney’s threat of prosecution violated the students’ First
Amendment right against compelled speech because the program
required the students to write an essay explaining their actions and why
they were wrong.86 They claimed that the essay requirement constituted
a violation of the students’ First Amendment rights because it forced the
students to write something they may not have believed: that in sending
sexually explicit text messages, they engaged in improper or unethical
acts.87 Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that the District Attorney’s threat of
prosecution was retaliatory and violated the parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from governmental interference in raising
their children. 88 They claimed that the required educational program
would violate this right because parents should decide whether the
material contained in the program is necessary and beneficial for their
children’s upbringing.89
The plaintiffs sought immediate relief in the form of a temporary
restraining order restricting the District Attorney from filing criminal
charges against the students who refused to participate in the program.90
The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ injunction on their First
Amendment compelled speech and Fourteenth Amendment claims only;
the court rejected the First Amendment free speech and expression
claim. 91 The court granted the temporary restraining order, thereby
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
82 Miller, 598 F.3d at 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385
F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004)).
83 Id. at 147.
84 Id. at 148.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Miller, 598 F.3d at 148.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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restricting the District Attorney from bringing charges against the
students. 92 The District Attorney subsequently filed an interlocutory
appeal to the Third Circuit.93 The Third Circuit declined to consider the
First Amendment freedom of expression claim because the parties did
not defend the claim before the court, but the court would allow the
parties to continue with the claim in the event that the case proceeded on
the merits.94
The Third Circuit decided that the District Attorney’s original
threat of prosecution was not a retaliatory measure against the exercise of
the students and parents’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.95 The
District Attorney’s threat of prosecution was made before the students
exercised their First Amendment rights; thus the threat could not be
classified as retaliatory.96 The circuit court found, however, that future
prosecution by the District Attorney would be a retaliatory act and
affirmed the injunction on this ground.97 Because the students had, by
that point, exercised their rights by not attending the sexting program,
any future prosecution would be akin to retaliation. Retaliation,
however, could not have occurred before the students exercised their
rights.
Although the plaintiffs in Miller failed to successfully establish that
the District Attorney had retaliated against the exercise of their
constitutional rights, the Court concluded that future prosecution would
be retaliation.98 Thus, the Court proceeded to make findings under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to support its decision for an injunction. A plaintiff must
prove three elements under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to establish a retaliation
claim: that the plaintiff engaged in a constitutionally protected act; that
the government’s response to that act was retaliatory; and that the
protected actions caused the retaliation. 99 The court found that the
plaintiffs satisfied all three elements.100
First, plaintiffs satisfied the first element of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
demonstrating that their conduct was protected by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs asserted that the District Attorney infringed on their Fourteenth
Amendment right to raise their children as they saw fit without

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 145.
Id.
Miller, 598 F.3d at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 147.
Miller, 598 F.3d at 150, 152, 153.

2011]

TEENAGE SEXTING

201

governmental interference.101 Here, the parents objected to the pedagogy
that instructed students that their actions were per se “wrong.”102 The
parents also did not agree with the educators teaching their children
views about a girl’s role in society, when they did not share the same
views. 103 Specifically, one parent objected to the teaching that her
daughter’s “actions were morally ‘wrong,’” and argued that the program
turned her daughter into a victim because it contradicted the “beliefs she
wishes to instill in her daughter.”104 The Third Circuit agreed and stated
that the District Attorney cannot coerce parents into allowing state actors
to impose their ideas about “morality and gender roles” on the
children.105 The District Attorney could offer the education program as a
truly voluntary program, but could not threaten prosecution for failing to
attend it.106 The court held that the plaintiffs are “likely to succeed in
showing that the education program required by the District Attorney
impermissibly usurped and violated [their] fundamental right[s] to raise
[their] child[ren] without undue state interference.”107
The plaintiffs further satisfied the first element of their § 1983
claim by alleging that defendant’s actions violated their First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.108 Specifically, they
argued that the program’s paper-writing requirement constituted
compelled speech, particularly because the paper necessitated the
conclusion that the students’ appearances in the photographs were
morally wrong.109 The court agreed and held that, at this early stage, it
was likely that the plaintiffs could prove that the program would violate
the students’ First Amendment rights.110
The second element of a retaliation claim requires that the
government respond with a retaliatory act.111 An act is retaliatory if it is
“sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
constitutional rights.”112 The court held that in this instance, the District
101

Id. at 150.
Id.
103 Id. The program would have discussed what it means to be a girl in today’s
society, including the advantages and disadvantages of being a girl, the formation of
gender identity, sexual violence and harassment, and forming self concepts. Id. at 144.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 151.
106 Miller, 598 F.3d at 151.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 152 (quoting W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Miller, 598 F.3d. at 152 (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.
2003)).
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Attorney’s actions qualified as retaliatory because “[t]here is no doubt a
prosecution meets this test and the District Attorney does not argue
otherwise.”113
The third element of a retaliation claim is causation.114 There must
be a causal connection between the first two elements: the plaintiffs’
constitutionally protected activity and the District Attorney’s retaliatory
act.115 The Third Circuit found that this connection existed because of
the District Attorney’s own statement that he would “respond”116 to the
plaintiff’s decision to forego the educational program by prosecuting
her. 117 The court emphasized that an offer to attend a pre-indictment
program followed by prosecution for refusal to attend the program would
not constitute causation for retaliation in every instance.118 Rather, the
key factor for the retaliation claim is that the plaintiffs’ choice not to
participate in the sexting educational program is protected under the
Constitution.119 Thus, the court ensured that, under its holding, programs
such as court-ordered traffic school or mandated Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings could not be considered retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Additionally, the court noted that any future prosecution of the
students for additional crimes in connection with the sexts at issue would
be a retaliatory act due to the District Attorney’s lack of evidence. 120
There was no probable cause to charge plaintiffs with possession or
distribution of child pornography.121 The District Attorney asserted that
their mere appearance in the photographs constituted sufficient grounds
to bring charges against the students, but the court found that being
photographed is not evidence of possessing or distributing child
pornography. 122 The Third Circuit, however, allowed the District
Attorney the opportunity to vacate the injunction if he produced evidence
of probable cause at a later time.123
Thus, the Third Circuit found that without injunctive relief from the
court, the students and parents would either have to relinquish their
Fourteenth and First Amendment rights to evade prosecution or maintain

113

Id. at 152 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)).
Id. at 152.
115 Id.
116 The court interpreted the word “respond” to mean “retaliate for.” Id. at 153.
117 Id. at 153.
118 Miller, 598 F.3d at 153.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 154.
121 Id. (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263; Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th
Cir. 2006)).
122 Id.
123 Id.
114
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those rights but face prosecution.124 The court held that the “Hobson’s
Choice” the District Attorney presented the students was
unconstitutional.125 The Third Circuit concluded that the “plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on their claims that any prosecution would
not be based on probable cause . . . but instead in retaliation” for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.126 Thus, the court affirmed
the district court’s award of a preliminary injunction.127
III. ANALYSIS: SEXTING EDUCATIONAL CLASSES DO NOT
AUTOMATICALLY VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS
Some parents, like those in Miller, claim that the government
cannot regulate their child’s sexting activity because of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to raise their child without government interference.
This right, however, is not absolute.128 The government can limit this
right and use its role as parens patriae to regulate sexting when a child’s
safety or well being is in danger. 129 Thus, the government has the
authority to regulate sexting through educational programs.
A. Parental Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Although the Third Circuit held that the state could not
constitutionally require students to attend a sexting educational program,
its holding was narrow and does not preclude the institution of sexting
educational programs per se. The court in Miller held that future
retaliation by the District Attorney would be unconstitutional because it
would deprive the students of their rights by requiring them to either
attend the program or face criminal prosecution.130 Under the facts of
Miller and the court’s focus on a retaliatory act of the District
Attorney, 131 the Third Circuit correctly decided the case. The Third
Circuit, however, ruled too broadly in its more general holding: that the
requirement that children attend a program that educates students about
the dangers of sexting violates the Fourteenth Amendment. On the
124

Miller, 598 F.3d. at 155.
Id. at 155. A Hobson’s Choice is defined as “an apparently free choice when there
is no real alternative.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, Hobson’s Choice Definition: MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hobson%27s+choice (last
visited May 13, 2011).
126 Miller, 598 F.3d at 155.
127 Id.
128 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
129 Id. at 166 (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
130 Miller, 598 F.3d at 148.
131 Id. at 155.
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contrary, absent retaliation by a state official in violation of 42 U.S.C §
1983, a court is likely to rule that requiring students to attend an
educational program about sexting does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because the government has a compelling interest in
protecting children from the harmful effects of sexting.
1. History of the Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment
Even though the court in Miller found that requiring sexting
education classes likely violates a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to raise his or her children without governmental interference, 132 it is
more likely that the government can require students to participate in
sexting education classes without infringing on Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The decision in Miller is not fatal to the principle that children in
public schools may be required to take educational classes about sexting.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s right to raise his
or her children without government interference, this protection is not
absolute. 133 There are circumstances in which the government can
intervene in parenting decisions and the Supreme Court has upheld such
interference.134
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that,
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.135

The Supreme Court has held that a parent’s right to raise his or her
child without governmental interference under the Fourteenth
Amendment is a fundamental right.136
A court must apply strict scrutiny when examining cases that
involve an alleged infringement of a person’s Fourteenth Amendment
right.137 This is the highest standard the court can apply in evaluating
132

Id. at 151.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
134 See id.
135 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (2010).
136 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (U.S. 1978) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–33 (U.S. 1972); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)).
137 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). The court stated that “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids
the government to infringe . . . fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process
is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
133
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whether the government has an interest that conflicts with the
constitutional right of a citizen.138 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the
government must have a compelling interest that justifies interfering with
a person’s constitutional right.139 Additionally, the interference must be
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest.140 The court must
also look at the means by which the state attempts to accomplish its
purpose and decide whether they are reasonable.141
A parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to make decisions about
raising his or her child has been developed through several decisions
from the Supreme Court of the United States. The first Supreme Court
case to discuss the parental right was Meyer v. Nebraska.142 In Meyer, a
Nebraska state law prohibited teaching a language other than English to
any child in eighth grade or any student twelve years of age or under.143
The Court held that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to allow
the teacher to teach the language.144 Additionally, the Court held that the
Nebraska law interfered with parental authority to manage the education
of one’s children.145
Next, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters146 held that
the right of parents to choose the upbringing of their children is
fundamental. 147 In this case, the Compulsory Education Act of 1922
required every parent or guardian to send his or her children between the
ages of eight and sixteen to a public school; thus, the law excluded
private schools as a possible means to educate children between ages
eight and sixteen. 148 The Supreme Court held that the Compulsory
Education Act “unreasonably” interfered with the right of parents and
guardians to control the upbringing of their children and the ability to
make educational decisions for them, including where to send their
children to school.149 The Court notably stated that “[t]he child is not the
interest.’” Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
66 (2000) (“In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
138 See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995).
139 See id. at 202, 230.
140 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 202, 227; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
280 (1986).
141 Id.; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
142 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
143 Id. at 396.
144 See id. at 403.
145 Id. at 401.
146 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
147 See id. at 532–34.
148 Id. at 530.
149 Id. at 534–35 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
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mere creature of the [s]tate; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.”150
Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court returned to the
discussion of compulsory education laws in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 151
Wisconsin law required children to attend either public or private school
until they reached the age of sixteen.152 The Supreme Court extended the
Pierce decision and held that the state could not force parents to send
their children to a formal school because it violated parents’ rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.153 The Court also noted that there
was no evidence of “any harm to the physical or mental health of the
child[ren] or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare” that would
potentially allow for the state to step in and regulate their education.154
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reiterated these earlier
holdings, which clearly demand that courts bolster the Fourteenth
Amendment by protecting against governmental attempts to control the
education of the nation’s children. Justice Ginsburg, in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 155 stated that “choices about marriage, family life, and the
upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has
ranked as of basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the [s]tate’s unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or disrespect.”156 The most recent case on the issue of parents’
fundamental right to raise their children is Troxel v. Granville. 157 In
Troxel, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that allowed third
parties, including grandparents, to petition for visitation rights over the
protests of the child’s parents.158 The Court reiterated: “the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.”159 The Supreme Court has consistently held parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights in high regard in the past.160
150

Id. at 535.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
152 Id. at 207.
153 Id. at 234.
154 Id. at 230.
155 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
156 Id. at 116 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis removed).
157 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
158 Id. at 63, 75.
159 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
160 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
151
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The developing problem of sexting has recently fueled the debate
about when the government has the authority to limit parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment right to raise their children without government
interference. At first glance, a mandatory sexting education course
seems to conflict with the fundamental right because parents’ rights to
choose whether their children participate in these programs seems to fall
under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parents could argue
that these classes conflict with their beliefs and how they want their
children raised. Thus, following the standard set out by the Supreme
Court over the past century, it seems that a mandatory sexting education
class would infringe on a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right. But the
parental right to raise one’s child without government interference is not
a complete freedom, and the government may be able to impose the
sexting program on the students under certain circumstances. 161
2. Limitations on Parents’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Protection of a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to make
decisions regarding how to raise his or her child is not absolute. The
state can interfere with parenting decisions if it is necessary to protect a
child. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the defendant was
convicted of violating state child labor laws by allowing her child to
preach on the street and sell religious pamphlets.162 The Court departed
from its earlier decisions restricting the government’s interference with
parents’ control over their children and held that when it is in the
public’s interest, “the family itself is not beyond regulation.” 163 The
court recognized that when it is necessary to protect a child’s safety and
well being the state can act as parens patriae and can “restrict the
parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child’s labor and in many other ways.”164 Thus, the Court held that
the need to protect children from harm or exploitation justified the state’s
interference.
The Court has also indicated that the state has broader authority
over the lives and activities of children than it has over adults.165 For
example, in Prince, the Court held that the state has the power to control
the conduct of children in order to protect them against the dangers of

161

See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
Id. at 161–62.
163 Id. at 166 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890)).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 168.
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preaching religion on a highway.166 The Court reasoned that “[p]arents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves.” 167 Here, the Supreme Court
appropriately balanced parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right against the
state’s right to intervene for the welfare and safety of children.
The Supreme Court has not only held that government may
intervene in a parental decision normally protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment due to its parens patriae power, but the Court has also held
that a public school system may intervene in certain circumstances
because public schools are recognized as “instruments of the state.”168
As such, school officials can restrict students’ rights when they exercise
their authority as in loco parentis in order to protect the students at
school. 169 Courts have recognized that because children spend a
significant amount of the day in school, while in school they are in the
custody of the school system.170
The Third Circuit in Gruenke v. Siep171 held that there are situations
in which school officials need to impose standards and restrict the
conduct of students even when parents may disagree.172 These situations
arise because the school must “maintain order and a proper educational
atmosphere.”173 In Gruenke, the parents of a high school student sued a
high school swim team coach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for requiring their
daughter to take a pregnancy test in violation of her First and Fourth
Amendment rights.174 The Third Circuit accepted that there are times
when the school’s views and actions may conflict with the parents’ right
to raise their children.175 When such a conflict occurs, the parents’ right
should take precedent over the school’s policies unless “the school’s
action is tied to a compelling interest.”176 In Gruenke, the Third Circuit
166

Prince, 321 U.S. at 169.
Id. at 170.
168 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S 675, 683 (1986).
169 Id. at 684 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982)).
170 See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 304 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1995); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
347–48 (1985)).
174 Id. at 295.
175 Id. at 305.
176 Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 305.
167

2011]

TEENAGE SEXTING

209

decided that the coach’s actions were unreasonable and violated the
student’s rights; however, the court held that there are some instances
where this conduct would be reasonable, such as when there is a
legitimate concern for the student’s health. 177 Significantly, the court
stated that the right to familial privacy is inevitably restricted while
students are in a public school setting where “the state’s power is
‘custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control
that could not be exercised over free adults.’”178
Further, the Third Circuit, in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of
Education,179 held that there are times when “the parental right to control
the upbringing of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control
curriculum and the school environment.”180 In this case, students in the
seventh through twelfth grades were asked to complete a survey entitled,
“Profiles of Student Life: Attitudes and Behaviors.” 181 The survey
consisted of questions involving the students’ “drug and alcohol use,
sexual activity, experience of physical violence, attempts at suicide,
personal associations and relationships (including the parental
relationship), and views on matters of public interest.”182 The court held
that even if the survey was a requirement, it did not amount to a violation
of a family’s constitutional right to privacy.183 Further, the court stated
that “[i]t is clear . . . that [a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing
and education] is neither absolute nor unqualified.”184 Finally, the court
decided that the school officials did not violate the students’
constitutional rights.185
The dangers of sexting justify a limitation on parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment right to raise their children without governmental
intervention because the potential harm caused by sexting poses a
significant threat to the public interest. As previously discussed,
teenagers who are caught sexting face potential criminal charges for the
dissemination or viewing of child pornography, the possible
177

Id. at 301.
Id. at 304 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
179 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
180 Id. at 182 (citing Swanson v. Guthrie Independent Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th
Cir. 1998); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir.
1996); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot,
Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995)).
181 Id. at 161.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 183–84.
184 Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983); Croft v. Westmoreland
Co. Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997); Hodge v. Jones, 31
F.3d 157, 163–64 (4th Cir.1994)).
185 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 190 (3d Cir. 2005).
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dissemination of their own private sexual images, and bullying. 186 In
addition, it is necessary for the government to protect children’s well
being and safety because many are vulnerable and unable to make
mature decisions; the choice to sext is clearly one of these decisions.
In particular, when sexting occurs at a public school during school
hours, the sexting falls within the bounds of both the government and the
school board’s compelling interests. A student’s act of sexting can
interfere with the educational atmosphere. The school needs to
affirmatively act in order to protect a student who directly engages in
sexting, as well as to safeguard all other students who may be affected by
such conduct. The compelling interest of both the school and the state
justifies any infringement on a parent’s right to raise his or her child that
is affected by the sexting education class requirement.
3. Additional Limitations on Parents’ Fourteenth Amendment
Rights with Respect to Education
Courts have found that parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights are
subject to government intervention when there is potential for substantial
harm to the child.187 Additionally, the government has imposed other
limitations on parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, further indicating
that this right is not absolute. 188 When it comes to education, both
children’s rights and parents’ rights are limited. Thus, with respect to
sexting in the educational atmosphere, parents’ Fourteenth Amendment
rights should also be limited. This discussion will focus on those
requirements the states in the Third Circuit impose that effectively limit
parents’ with respect to their children’s education.
First, the state can mandate compulsory education attendance
through state truancy laws.189 New Jersey law requires parents to send
their children, ages six through sixteen, to public school or a school that
would provide an equivalent standard of education.190 The courts have
also held that the statute enforcing mandatory attendance is constitutional
and that education, “is a matter of public concern and legislative
regulation and should be enforced as long as the requirements are
reasonable.”191
In Pennsylvania, a compulsory school attendance law requires
every child of the “compulsory school age” who resides in the state to
186
187
188
189
190
191

Eraker, supra note 46, at 577.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (2011).
Everson, 133 N.J.L. 350, 355–56 (E. & A. 1945), aff’d, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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attend school. 192 The statute defines “compulsory school age” as
between the ages of eight and seventeen. 193 The State Board of
Education must provide standards for the subjects and activities that all
children must learn in school.194 The subjects must be taught in English,
and the child must continuously attend school throughout the entire time
public school is in session.195 The statute also provides an allowance for
children to attend private schools, boarding schools, and to be home
schooled as long as the education meets the standards set out by the State
Board of Education.196 Parents or guardians who do not comply with this
law are subject to fines, required attendance of a parenting course, or
even jail time.197 One of Pennsylvania’s two Superior Courts has held
that the compulsory education laws are not unconstitutionally overbroad
or vague.198
Finally, Delaware laws require compulsory attendance for
children between the ages of five and sixteen years old.199 The statutes
require anyone who has legal custody of a child in this age range to
enroll the child in public school, where the student must attend the
minimum number of school days and attend any activity required by
state law.200 The statute states that a student is considered a “truant” if he
or she misses three or more days of school per year without a valid
excuse.201 The statute also allows students to enroll in private school or
to receive homeschooling so long as they would receive an education
that is equivalent to the curriculum required in public schools.202
Second, schools and the government also regulate children’s
activities in schools through mandatory subjects and curriculum. One
subject of controversy is sexual education classes. Sexual education
requirements vary from state to state. New Jersey requires schools to
offer classes that provide lessons on abstinence and sexually transmitted
disease (STD) prevention. 203 Similarly, Delaware public schools are
legally required to provide sex education and information, but also must
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24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327(a) (2011).
Id. at § 13-1326(a).
194 Id. at § 13-1327(a).
195 Id.
196 Id. at § 13-1327(b)–(d).
197 Id. at § 13-1333(a).
198 See In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
199 14 DEL. CODE. ANN. 14 § 2702(a)(1) (2011).
200 Id. at § 2702(a)(1)–(3).
201 Id. at § 2702(a)(3).
202 Id. at § 2703.
203 TEEN-AID.ORG,
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Sex
Education
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http://www.teenaid.org/State_Resourses/State_Sex_Education_Laws.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
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include other contraception information. 204 In Pennsylvania, however,
schools are not legally required to offer a sex education class; instead,
they are merely required to be able to give information on abstinence and
methods for STD prevention if students inquire about it.205
In Smith v. Ricci,206 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a sex education course requirement. The State Board
of Education required school districts to teach a “family life” educational
program.207 The Board’s regulation also included an “excusal clause,”
which stated that if a parent or guardian did not agree with any part of
the educational program because it conflicted with their moral or
religious beliefs, then the child would be excused from only the portion
of the program that was in conflict; however, the regulation still required
the student to attend the remaining portion of the class.208 Despite this
clause, parents challenged the regulation by arguing that the program
infringed on the students’ and parents’ First Amendment rights of
freedom of religion.209 They also argued that the educational program
was an establishment of religion. 210 The court held that because it
included an option for parents to remove their children from the portions
of the program that violated their beliefs, the regulation did not infringe
on parent or children’s rights.211
The plaintiffs also argued that the program violated parents’ rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their children. 212 They
claimed that there was no reasonable relation between the requirement of
an educational program and the goals that this educational program
sought to achieve.213 The court, however, held that the program did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was a reasonable and
necessary means to achieve the school’s interest in the “reduction of
teenage pregnancy, venereal disease, and other social problems.” 214
Thus, if a sexting education program is narrowly tailored to the
government’s goal of preventing the dangers associated with sexting, and
204

Id.
Id.
206 446 A.2d 501 (N.J. 1982).
207 Id. at 502.
208 Id. at 504–05.
209 Id. at 502–03.
210 Id. at 503.
211 Id. at 505 (citing Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 478 P.2d 314 (Haw. 1970); Citizens for
Parental Rights v. San Mateo Bd. of Ed., 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), appeal
dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Ed., 289 A.2d 914 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1970), appeal dismissed, 305 A.2d 536 (Conn. 1973)).
212 Ricci, 446 A.2d at 507.
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the program is a necessary means of achieving that goal, then it is
unlikely that the imposition of such a program would violate parents’
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
The government can also constitutionally require students to attend
sexting education classes because children’s constitutional rights are not
as expansive as those of adults. 215 Although the government cannot
threaten criminal prosecution if an adult exercises a constitutionally
protected right, children’s constitutional rights are restricted, especially
while in school.216 This limitation is due to the state’s role as a custodian
or in loco parentis to the children in its jurisdiction.217
In Bellotti v. Baird,218 the Supreme Court held that minors are in a
unique position and their rights are not equal to those of adults.219 The
Court stated that “the peculiar vulnerability of children” and “their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner”
are justifications for the necessary reduction of a child’s rights.220 Courts
have applied this concept to hold that laws that limit the rights of minors,
such as age limits on marriage, are constitutional.221
Further, the Supreme Court has given schools the discretion to limit
the rights of students while they are in the school’s custody by
diminishing students’ Fourth Amendment rights. 222 The Court has
justified this limitation by invoking the school’s special need to protect
children on school grounds. 223 The Fourth Amendment provides that
individuals have the right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and that this
right “shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”224 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,225 the Court held that there are limits
on the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protection when school authorities
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Acton, 515 U.S at 655.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).

214

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:189

perform searches while children are on school property.226 The Court
stressed that ordinarily the Fourth Amendment protects students from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 227 Reasonable expectations of
privacy, however, are more limited for students in school than they are
elsewhere.228
The Supreme Court noted that school officials have the authority to
limit students’ rights in order to foster public policy. 229 The Court
explained that there is a need to balance the students’ right to privacy and
the school’s interest in providing a proper educational atmosphere.230 In
balancing these interests, “[i]t is evident that the school setting requires
some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities
are ordinarily subject.”231 Due to this necessity, the Supreme Court held
that a warrant is not necessary for school authorities to search a student’s
person or property while that student is under the school’s control.232
Therefore, school officials do not need to meet the high level of probable
cause to search students, so long as they have a reasonable suspicion.233
The Court concluded that, for the school to have the ability to maintain
order, the “legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”234 Thus, a
search will be justified when a school official has “reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.”235
The Third Circuit’s ruling in Miller seems consistent with the trend
towards reducing privacy rights and increasing government interference
with schoolchildren’s rights, which the Supreme Court began with its
ruling in T.L.O. Ten years later, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,236
the Supreme Court strengthened the holding in T.L.O. by further
narrowing constitutional protections for students. 237 In Vernonia, an
Oregon school district had instituted a student athlete drug policy that
called for random drug testing of student athletes.238 The issue before the
Court was whether this policy violated the students’ Fourth and
226
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228
229
230
231
232
233
234
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Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the policy, all students in the
school who wanted to play sports were required to sign a form
consenting to random drug testing and to obtain the written consent of
their parents.239 The school tested the athletes at the beginning of the
season and then randomly tested ten percent of the athletes each week
during their sports season.240
The Supreme Court stated that courts must apply a reasonableness
standard to determine whether such searches are constitutional.241 This
standard requires balancing the degree of governmental infringement on
a person’s Fourth Amendment right against the government’s interest.242
When there are “special needs,” a warrant is not required for a search;
when a warrant is not required, neither is probable cause.243 The Court
stated that “special needs” are present in the school setting because
minors are not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection
that is accorded to adults.244 For example, minors do not have the same
rights to liberty—”the right to come and go at will”—because their
parent or guardian controls their physical freedom. 245 When parents
place their children in private school, the school officials must act in loco
parentis to the children, and when children are placed in public schools,
the officials have a “custodial and tutelary” power over them.246 This
creates control over minors that is not constitutionally permissible with
respect to adults.247 The Supreme Court clarified, however, that students
do not lose their rights entirely when they are at school; the “nature of
those rights” only becomes what is “appropriate for children in
school.”248 The Court concluded that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public
schools than elsewhere.”249
The Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier250
also held that students’ rights, which would ordinarily be constitutionally
protected, are limited while in the custody of the school. 251 In
Kuhlmeier, a group of students claimed that various school officials
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violated their First Amendment right to free speech when the officials
removed two articles from the school newspaper. 252 One article
concerned pregnant teenagers within the school and sexuality of students,
while the other discussed how students were affected by their parents’
divorces. 253 School officials were concerned about protecting the
identity of the pregnant teenagers as well as protecting younger students
from the “inappropriate” references to teen sexuality and birth control
discussed in the articles.254 The court held that students’ right to free
expression can be limited if it “substantially interfere[s] with the work of
the school or impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.” 255
Additionally, it is for the school, not a federal court, to decide what
conduct is inappropriate within the school, and whether that conduct can
be restricted.256
The aforementioned cases—Bellotti,257 T.L.O.,258 and Kuhlmeier259
—demonstrate the Supreme Court’s mandate that, in certain
circumstances, schools may have a compelling interest that justifies their
interference with parents’ and children’s constitutional rights.260 Clearly,
children’s constitutional rights can be limited in the school setting. 261
Thus, if a school system establishes that protecting students from sexting
is a compelling interest, and also shows that providing sexting education
classes is narrowly tailored to protect that interest, then such classes
would be immune from claims by parents or students arguing that these
classes violate their constitutional rights. Because students are under the
custody of school officials while attending school,262 the school has a
compelling interest in protecting them from the dangers of sexting.
Additionally, the school has an interest in protecting other students from
the disruptions that sexting can cause in their education.263
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V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO SOLVE THE TEENAGE SEXTING PROBLEM
Sexting is a pervasive problem that has generated a compelling
state interest and is a problem that needs to be solved through
government intervention. Retaliatory prosecution, like that in Miller, of
a student who elects not to attend a sexting education program is not the
correct way to solve the problem of sexting. Like truancy and child
labor, sexting is another danger against which the government should
protect children by following the pattern of limiting parents’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights and children’s rights. There are two potential
solutions to the sexting problem that call for government intervention
rather than retaliatory prosecution.
One option would require state legislatures to create sexting
educational classes or integrate sexting education into their family and
sex education classes. Education is an important starting point to solving
the problem of teenage sexting. Unlike the situation in Miller, in which
the implementation of classes only came after students were caught
sexting, implementing these programs would help to prevent the problem
through preemptive action. Implementation of sexting education courses
is also likely to evade Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny by the courts
because the government has a compelling interest in regulating
children’s sexting activities. 264 If, however, courts find that requiring
students to attend a sexting education program does violate the
Constitution, the government may still be able to teach students about the
dangers of sexting by imposing the requirement to make the sexting class
an option or by utilizing an excusal clause.
The second potential solution to the sexting problem in schools is to
create specific sexting criminal legislation. Currently, many states have
responded to the problem in this manner. 265 Pennsylvania, the home
state of Miller, is in the process of approving a bill—House Bill 815—
that would make sexting among minors a second-degree misdemeanor
crime, instead of a felony.266 On May 23, 2011, the Pennsylvania House
of Representatives approved the bill, and it currently awaits the Senate’s
approval.267
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The bill defines the offense of “sexting” as “ knowingly
transmit[ing] an electronic communication or disseminat[ing] a depiction
of himself or another minor, or possess[ing] a depiction of another
minor, engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”268 The bill, however, will
not cover the depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity, which is
punishable under other Pennsylvania laws regarding the sexual abuse of
a child.269 It also does not apply to depictions of a minor engaged in
“sexually explicit conduct,” if the depiction was “taken, made, produced,
used or intended to be used for or in furtherance of a commercial
purpose.” 270 This offense would also be punishable under different
Pennsylvania laws.271
Pennsylvania State Representative and the bill’s sponsor, Seth
Grove, stated that the goal of the sexting bill “ensures that students don’t
ruin the rest of their life because of making some childish decisions, and
sending nude photographs of themselves or others.”272 Because of this
goal, the bill also allows for a minor to avoid prosecution, through
judicial discretion, by permitting the minor to participate in a
diversionary program and allowing for eventual expungement.273
Parents are likely to challenge any statute concerning sexting by
arguing that it infringes on their Fourteenth Amendment rights to raise
their children without governmental interference. As explained in Part
IV, 274 however, this right is not absolute and the state can regulate
sexting over parents’ objections. Sexting is not only a private problem
between the child and the parent; it is a public concern. Parents may lack
the ability to catch the sexting or to effectively deter future behavior.
Parents also may choose not to punish their children because they do not
believe sexting is wrong. Although some parents may not believe that
sexting is wrong, the dangers of sexting certainly could have a negative
effect upon a child’s future and on the welfare of society. Without
proper guidance and prevention, the sexting phenomenon is likely to
escalate, leading to an increase in the harms that stem from sexting, such
as bullying.275 This is a significant harm to children and, as such, the
government is justified in protecting against the harm. Thus, there is a
268
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strong justification for the government to intervene by educating children
about the effects of sexting.
Other states are also looking into legislative alternatives to the
criminal prosecution of sexting. On September 27, 2011, New Jersey’s
Acting Governor, Kim Guadagno, signed new sexting legislation into
law.276 The law creates a “diversionary” education program for juveniles
who are criminally charged for sexting or posting sexual images.277 This
program is intended to be an “alternative to prosecution” of minors who
are “charged with a criminal offense for posting sexually suggestive or
sexually explicit photographs, or who engage in the behavior commonly
known as ‘sexting,’ in which these pictures are transmitted via cell
phones.” 278 It will be limited to juveniles who are charged with an
offense under the New Jersey statute that protects against the
endangerment of children’s welfare; such endangerment includes the
“creation, exhibition or distribution without malicious intent of a
photograph depicting nudity . . . through the use of an interactive
wireless communications device or a computer.”279
The bill gives the prosecutor the discretion of admitting the minor
into the program; additionally, those who complete the program avoid
prosecution.280 If the prosecutor does not exercise this discretion, court
intake services can recommend the diversionary program based on the
following factors: the severity of the offense or conduct and the
circumstances surrounding the act, the offender’s “age and maturity,”
whether the juvenile is a “substantial danger to others,” the juvenile’s
family history and circumstances, including drug, alcohol, or child abuse,
whether the juvenile or his family have had prior interaction with court
intake services, the outcome, the result of those interactions, the
availability of the educational program, recommendations by the victim,
arresting officer, recommendation by the prosecutor, and the
“amenability of the juvenile to participation in a remedial education or
counseling program.”281
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The proposed educational program would consist of the “juvenile’s
participation in a remedial education or counseling program.”282 It will
educate juveniles about the “legal consequences and penalties for sharing
sexually suggestive or explicit materials,” as well as the “non-legal
consequences,” such as the effect the activity could have on relationships
and the damage it could do to the child’s future opportunities in
employment and education, and the effect it could have on current school
activities.283 Additionally, the program would discuss the “long-term and
unforeseen consequences for sharing sexually suggestive or explicit
materials” and the connection between bullying, cyber-bullying and
sharing the material.284 The state’s Attorney General and the New Jersey
Judiciary will develop the educational program.285 The law will go into
effect in April 2012.286
Bill A-4069 helps avoid decisions like the one in Miller, because it
creates an educational program in lieu of prosecution before an act takes
place. By offering this discretion to prosecutors, the legislature avoids
the issue of prosecution as retaliation; yet, the bill could still face
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. As explained in Parts III and IV,
however, the state’s interest in protecting children is a significant and
compelling reason to limit this right.
Out of these options, a sexting education class is the best choice to
prevent the sexting problem before it escalates, because it would teach
children about how a sext could greatly affect and damage their futures.
The number of prosecutions teenagers could face would likely be
reduced if they were informed about the dangers of sexting and were
instructed that sexting could lead to criminal child pornography charges.
The proposed legislation is also laudable because it seeks to avoid
automatic prosecution for a child who sexts. Although New Jersey and
Pennsylvania are creating criminal statutes, these statutes are acceptable
because they first give children a chance to learn from their mistakes.
The statutes provide opportunities for children to learn about the dangers
of sexting before they are charged with a crime and before anything is
placed on their record.
V. CONCLUSION
The practice of teenage sexting implicates many issues arising from
teenagers’ actions. One of the most important aspects of the problem is
282
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the question of whether schools should be able to educate teens about the
dangers associated with sexting, with the intention that such education
will curb the increase in the growing number of teenagers who sext.
Miller v. Mitchell illustrated one attempt to deter the problem: offer
children the option of taking a sexting education class.287 Although the
retaliatory means employed by the District Attorney in this case were
held unconstitutional, ordinary sexting educational programs likely
would avoid the same fate. Even though the program will have to
withstand judicial strict scrutiny, the government’s compelling interest in
protecting the nation’s teenagers will likely be enough to overcome
constitutional protection. Even if the courts do not consider the
government’s interest to be sufficiently compelling to survive strict
scrutiny, it is still vital to educate children about the dangers of sexting.
The government can try to educate students by creating sexting classes or
introducing antisexting material into already formed sex education
classes in schools. To survive constitutional protections, the government
could also make such sexting programs optional or institute an excusal
clause for parents who do not want their children to participate in these
classes.
The sexting educational programs proposed in this Comment are
only a starting point for preventing child sexting practices.
Unfortunately, these programs cannot control what children do outside of
school and cannot ensure that children will listen and absorb what the
programs are teaching. It is important to start somewhere, however, and
the classes can provide necessary lessons about the dangers of sexting. If
an educational program can save one child’s future by informing him or
her about the consequences of sexting, then the government should
attempt to provide the program in a sufficiently tailored manner so as to
withstand strict constitutional scrutiny.
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